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The Equity Premium: 




We  examine  the  UK  equity  premium  over  more  than  a  century  using 
dividend growth to estimate expectations of capital gains employing the 
approach of Fama and French (2002). Since 1951 estimated equity premia 
implied by dividend growth have been much lower than that produced by 
average stock returns for the UK market as a whole; a finding corroborated 
by almost every industry sub-sector. Our empirical analysis suggests this 
is primarily due to a declining discount rate, during the latter part of the 
20
th Century, which would rationally stimulate unanticipated equity price 
rises during this period. Thus, we conclude that historical stock returns 




   
 ‘The  Equity  Premium  is  perhaps  the  single  most  important  number  in  financial 
economics’ remarks Welch  (2000, p. 501). The Equity Premium, the reward in terms of the 
extra return that investors demand for holding risky assets rather than risk-free assets, has 
numerous applications in finance from investment appraisal to portfolio asset allocation and 
from cost of capital estimation to investment performance evaluation. Nevertheless, Welch 
(2000)  notes  there  is  no  consensus  upon  how  the  equity  premium  should  be  estimated. 
Probably  the  most  popular  method  of  estimating  the  equity  premium  is  to  use  historical 
realised  excess  returns  observed  ex-post.  However,  the  magnitude  of  this  ex-post  equity 
premium of 6% p.a. cannot be reconciled with the theoretical prediction of less than 1% p.a. 
from the Consumption Capital Asset Pricing Model as demonstrated by Mehra and Prescott 
(1985). Hence an equity premium of the enormity observed historically is deemed to be a 
puzzle. 
A weakness of using ex-post returns is that it relies upon the assumption that investors’ 
expected returns in the long run and on average will equal realised returns. This assumption 
has been challenged, specifically with regard to the Equity Premium; perhaps the expectations 
of investors might not be adequately described by the observed return series. Rietz (1988) 
asserts that historical data fails to account for the probability of economic catastrophes or 
disaster scenarios which would be incorporated into rational investors’ expectations. Whereas 
Brown  et  al.  (1995)  point  out  that  since  the  US  market  didn’t  experience  a  significant 
interruption  during  the  20
th  Century  unlike  many  other  financial  centres,  historical  risk 
estimates in the US are biased downwards. However, since bondholders appear to suffer as 
much if not more than equityholders during such scenarios these hypotheses fail to provide an 
adequate explanation for the equity premium puzzle. 
An alternative method to estimate equity premia and to examine expected returns more 
directly is to use fundamentals such as dividends in order to estimate the expected return 
investors’  could  anticipate  (Jagannathan  et  al.,  (2001)  and  Fama  and  French,  (2002)).  
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Jaganathan et al. (2001) using the Gordon discounted dividend model
1 claim that since 1970 
the expected equity premium has only been about 0.7% p.a, defining the premia as equity 
returns  in  excess  of  long-term  government  bonds.  Fama  and  French  (2002)  also  use  a 
dividend-based model that implies an expected equity premia over commercial paper of about 
2.5% for 1951-2000 rather than the 7.5% average historical return received during this period. 
These empirical analyses suggest that in the US, realised returns have been substantially 
above the expected returns implied by fundamentals during the latter part of the 20
th Century. 
An implication of this is that the ex-ante equity premium may be considerably smaller than 
the 6% indicated by ex-post returns. However, there appears to be a second puzzle. Why have 
realised returns been so far above the expected returns implied by these dividend growth 
models? 
The motivation of this study is threefold. Firstly, we provide estimates of the expected UK 
equity premia implied by fundamentals using data covering the entirety of the 20
th Century. 
We use the dividend growth model approach outlined by Fama and French (2002) to derive 
this estimate of expected returns and compare our results with the historical ex-post returns 
received by investors. This paper contributes to the literature examining the equity premium 
outside of the US market spanning the whole of the 20
th Century, for which there is currently 
a dearth of empirical research. A notable exception is Dimson et al. (2003) who focussing 
purely on realised returns provide some international evidence. In contrast, our focus is on 
expected returns and any discrepancy between realised returns and expected returns. 
We extend our analysis to consider the industry dynamic of realised and expected returns, 
an aspect that seems to have been overlooked in previous studies. The importance of industry-
level data is that it can give an indication of how widely observed and representative the 
market results are. Although we are restricted by data availability to a post-1965 analysis of 
industry returns, we do they find they lend considerable and widespread support to our main 
findings at the market level that historical returns have been above investors’ expectations.  
                                                 
1 The Discounted Dividend Model and the Fama-French Dividend Growth model are identical but are stimulated 
from different frameworks.   
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Our method of estimating expected returns, the Fama-French dividend growth model, we 
propose can be more appropriately applied in the context of the UK market than the US. This 
is because American corporations seem to have made substantial changes to their dividend 
payout policy, which could affect the model results. Recent research by Grullon and Michaely 
(2002) has documented that since the 1970’s: a) The US dividend payout ratio has declined 
substantially and b) Share repurchases by US firms have become an increasingly important 
means to distribute funds to shareholders. Such changes in payout policy could induce a 
downward bias upon equity premia estimates implied by dividend growth. However, these 
trends do not appear to have been mirrored in Britain. Rau and Vermaelen (2002) present 
evidence that until the late 1990’s share repurchases by UK firms were negligible, while Ap 
Gwilym et al. (2004) document that the UK aggregate payout ratio in December 2001 was 
above its historical average for 1962-2001. Consequently, the UK market is particularly well 
suited for the implementation of the dividend growth model.  
In light of this we examine in the context of more than 100 years of UK data if there is a 
disparity between the historical realised equity premium and the equity premium implied by 
dividends. The finding in this study that realised returns have been above expected returns 
implied  by  fundamentals  raises  important  issues  as  to  its  source.  Campbell  (1991) 
demonstrates that any deviations of realised returns from expectations can be prescribed to 
either a change in expected dividend growth or a change in expected returns or both. 
Secondly and consequently, the predictability of dividend growth is an important issue. 
Revisions in expectations of future dividend growth could potentially provide an explanation 
for  the  discrepencies  between  expected  returns  and  realised  returns  uncovered  by  our 
investigation of the equity premium in Section 3. Dividend growth predictability has received 
relatively little attention in the literature, notable exceptions in the context of the US market 
are Ang (2002) and Lettau and Ludvigson (2005). We firstly establish which factors are 
related to UK dividend growth in-sample, before extending our analysis to consider out-of-
sample forecasting. However, we find very little evidence that future dividend growth can be 
expected to be above its historical average.  
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Finally we examine if there has been a permanent shift in the time-series of expected 
returns. Several recent articles have posited that future expected returns for the early 21
st 
Century are lower than past realised returns (see e.g. Claus and Thomas, 2001 and Arnott and 
Bernstein, 2002). We provide additional evidence on this issue by investigating if there has 
been a structural break in the market and industry dividend-price ratios. The dividend-price 
ratio not only contains important information regarding the income yielded by portfolios. 
Moreover, it has also been an important variable for predicting future returns and thus capital 
gains as first documented by Fama and French (1988) and Campell and Shiller (1988). Thus, 
we contend our findings of a downward shift in the dividend-price ratio are indicative that 
expected returns have fallen. 
 
2. METHODOLOGY AND DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
(i) Data Description  
 
Our data covering the sample period 1900-2002 is taken from the Barclays Equity-Gilt 
Study, hereafter referred to as Barclays data. It covers firms listed on the London Stock 
Exchange.  The  Barclays  equity  index  for  the  period 1900-1962 comprises the 30 largest 
shares by market capitalisation in each year and is rebalanced annually. From 1962-2002 the 
data is derived from the FTSE All-Share Index. The Barclays equity-price index is value-
weighted  with  the  weights  of  constituent  companies  being  proportional  to  their  market 
capitalisation. The income yield on the index is derived from all the dividends actually paid 
by companies during the relevant year divided by the year end price (Dt/Pt). In this study we 
refer to this ratio as the dividend-price ratio. We define the dividend yield as the dividend 
paid during the current year expressed as a proportion of the prior years price (Dt/Pt-1). In 
addition to the equity price index and  income yield, we also collected by hand from the same 
source the treasury bill index and cost of living index. We use the cost of living index as a 
proxy for the consumer price index when calculating inflation on the Barclays dataset.  
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We  supplement  our  Barclays  dataset  with  data  gathered  from  Datastream  which  is 
available from 1966.  The Datastream Market index is a value-weighted index that covers the 
largest 550 firms quoted on the LSE
2. These 550 firms are split into separate industries and 
we collect data from the 8 broad industry subsets of the market. These industries cover a vast 
array  of  diverse  sectors  be  it  services,  consumer  goods,  primary  resources  or  industrial 
products and also encompasses cyclical and non-cyclical sectors. Consequently our industry 
dataset is comprehensive and rich, providing us with a broad cross-section for us to make our 
empirical investigations. Data on the UK consumer price index and treasury bill rate is from 
the IMF’s International Financial Statistics database courtesy of Datastream. 
In this study we examine the data in real terms, although our methodology is equally 
applicable to nominal values. Our preference for real terms stems from the basic tenet of 
financial theory that investors’ primary objective in investing is to transfer consumption from 
one time period to another; we are not primarily concerned with the nominal monetary value 
of our assets but rather the consumption stream that this monetary income will entitle us to. 
 
(ii) Methodology for Estimating Returns 
 
We employ the approach of Fama and French (2002) to derive estimates of average stock 
returns and expected average stock returns. Equation 1 gives the average return model, where 
A (  ) is the arithmetic average,  Dt is real dividend payments during the current time period t,  
Pt-1  is the real price index at the previous time period t-1 and Dt / Pt-1 is the dividend yield. 
GPt
3 is the proportional capital gain in time t. Thus, the average stock return is simply the 
average dividend yield plus the average capital gain: 
  1 ( ) ( ) ( ) t t t t A R A D P A GP - = +   (1) 
   
                                                 
2 We can report the Datastream market index and the Barclays price index are almost perfectly positively 
correlated, with a correlation co-efficient of 0.99. 
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1 1 ( ) t t t t GP P P P - - = -   
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If the dividend-price ratio (Dt / Pt) has a constant mean then over extended periods of time 
the  proportional  change  in  equity  prices  must  be  matched  by  an  almost  equivalent 
proportional  change  in dividends. Since a constant mean is one condition that stationary 
variables  must  satisfy,  it  follows  that  if  we  have  a  stationary  dividend-price  series  then 
dividend  growth  will  give  us  an  estimate  of  the  expected  growth  of  the  share  price. 
Consequently, we can obtain estimates from fundamentals of expected capital gains.
4 In fact, 
if the valuation ratio is approximately the same at the sample beginning and end then the 
average equity premium yielded by each method would be almost identical. 
The Fama-French Dividend Growth Model is defined in (2) as the return of the dividend 
model  (RDt)  being  given  by  the  average  dividend  yield  (Dt  /Pt-1)  plus  the  average  real 
dividend growth rate (GDt)
5:  
  -1  ( )     (   /   )     ( ) t t t t A RD A D P A GD = +   (2) 
 
This model is equivalent to the classic Gordon (1962) Dividend Growth model but is 
motivated and derived in a very different manner. The main assumption made in the Fama-
French model is that the ratio of dividends to price is stationary. If the valuation ratio is non-
stationary  then  dividend  growth  might  provide  a  poor  approximation  of  capital  gains. 
However, even if the series are not stationary, Fama and French (2002) claim their approach 
can still be employed provided the weaker condition that the series is mean-reverting or 
mean-reverting during each regime. They make the case that one can rationally expect there 
to  be  different  regimes  in  the  valuation  ratios  if  there  are  permanent  changes  in  factors 
determining asset prices. 
For example, if there is an unforeseen permanent increase in the dividend growth rate then 
prices would rationally shift upwards permanently perhaps causing the appearance of a non-
stationary section in the dividend-price ratio.  Fama and French (2002) suggest that when 
                                                 
4  Similar intuition applies to any other variable that is in a long-term stable relationship with prices. Other 
possible suitable candidate variables might be earnings or consumption. However reliable data, especially for 
earnings dating back to 1900 is unavailable for the UK market. Hence we only consider the dividend growth model 
outlined in (2). 
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1 1 ( ) t t t t GD D D D - - = -   
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there are such rational price shifts which could not be foreseen then fundamentals are a 
superior way to estimate expected equity returns. Since, the increase in the dividend growth 
rate was unexpected, investors’ actual returns are inflated due to the equity price rise that is 
simply due to good fortune in terms of unanticipated favourable economic news. However, 
this still poses a challenge for the researcher to demonstrate that their use of the dividend 
model in the place of any non-stationarities in the data can be justified on the basis of rational 
price adjustment.  
 
(iii) Unit Root Tests 
 
Stationarity, is a central issue for our dividend growth model, as outlined in Section 2.(ii). 
The model relies upon the ratio of the dividends to price being mean-reverting during regimes 
in order for dividend growth to give appropriate estimates of the capital gain of the share 
index.  More  generally,  stationarity  is  an  important  issue  since  it  is  a  pre-requisite  for 
regression analysis in order to avoid the possibility of generating spurious regression results 
(Granger and Newbold, 1974).  
[INSERT FIGURE 1: AROUND HERE]  
Our  sample  covers  a  period  of  more  than  100  years  during  which  there  has  been 
substantial  changes  to  the  economic  environment  within  which  firms  operate.  Given  the 
importance of this issue for our model, we utilise a rolling unit root procedure as suggested by 
Banerjee et al. (1992) to examine the stationarity of the Barclays market dividend-price ratio 
within sub-periods of our overall sample. Since the dividend-price ratio mean-reverts slowly, 
we use a rolling 40-year sample window
6 to conduct the Augmented Dickey Fuller test.  
[INSERT FIGURE 2: AROUND HERE]  
The unit root test statistic values and critical values are plotted through time in figure 2A. 
We find that the dividend-price ratio exhibits stationarity during almost all sample periods. 
                                                 
6 This seems an appropriate length of time, since the dividend-price ratio appears to mean-revert slowly.  
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For any 40-year sample period, except that ending in 1974, the Dickey-Fuller test always 
rejects the null hypothesis of a random walk at the 5% significance level. The rolling unit-root 
tests provide strong general support for the dividend-price ratio being stationary, as we can 
report was indicated by the test of the whole sample
7. 
A  difficulty  with  unit  root  tests,  particularly  the  Dickey-Fuller  test  is  that  outlying 
observations that quickly mean-revert inflate the test statistic increasing the likelihood of a 
stationary inference. Figure 1 reveals spikes in the Barclays market dividend-price ratio in 
1915, 1919 and 1921 corresponding to World War 1 and its immediate aftermath and in 1974 
due to the 1st OPEC oil crisis and subsequent UK market crash. The impact of these outliers 
are neutralised by estimating a dividend series (DPDUM) that uses zero-one spike dummy 
variables to control for their impact. The dividend-price ratio is regressed on a constant, four 
dummy  variables  (where  1915D  1919D,  1921D  and  1975D  are  dummy  variables)  and  a 
random error term. For example 1915D corresponds to a dummy variable that is 1 in 1915 
and 0 in all other years. 
    1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
/ .(1915 ) .(1919 ) .(1921 ) .(1974 )
/ .(1915 ) .(1919 ) .(1921 ) .(1974 )
t t t
t t
D P D D D D
DPDUM D P D D D D
a b b b b e
b b b b
= + + + + +
= - - - -
  (3) 
 
The results of the rolling unit root tests using the DPDUM series are illustrated in figure 
2B. Even with the outlying observations controlled for the pre-1990 data provides support for 
the data being stationary in all sub-periods. The main differences in the rolling stationarity 
test results are for periods ending after 1997. Before controlling for the 1974 dividend-price 
observation we found the data clearly rejected the null at the 5% significance level. However, 
when the effects of this outlier is controlled for we find evidence that samples ending in 1998 
or later are deemed to be non-stationary at the 5% significance level. Thus, the very end of the 
sample appears to exhibit some behaviour consistent with a random walk. This has perhaps 
                                                 
7 Stationarity tests for the full sample period reveal that the Barclays and all Datastream industry dividend-price 
ratios are stationary. All other variables used in regression analysis were also stationary. The full results are 
available from the authors upon request. Throughout the appropriate lag length for the ADF test is determined by 
the minimum AIC criterion. The Datastream indices are not analysed using a rolling unit root technique since 
fewer than 40 observations are available.  
10 
been brought about by the gradual transition of the dividend-price ratio to a new mean in the 
late 1990’s, an issue investigated in Section 4.(iii). 
Overall, apart from perhaps the post-1997 data, we find strong evidence that the Barclays 
market dividend-price ratio is stationary. Given dividends and prices appear to be in a stable 
long-term relationship, this implies that dividend growth is an appropriate proxy for capital 
gains and provides confirmation that the Fama-French dividend growth model derived in (2) 
can be justifiably applied to our dataset.  
 
3. EQUITY RETURN AND PREMIA ESTIMATES 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1: AROUND HERE] 
Perhaps the most striking feature of our results is that the UK equity premium from the 
overall UK market 1951-2002 based on average realised returns was 7.79%, which is more 
than 65% larger than the estimate of 4.60% from the Dividend Growth model. Over the 
period 1901-1950, the dividend growth model estimate of the annual UK equity premium of 
4.22%, was similar to the 3.49% premium given by the average returns model. Thus both 
fundamentals and historical returns indicate that the expected equity premium from the turn of 
the twentieth century to 1950 was about 4% per annum.  
Our results indicate that the dividend growth estimate of the equity premium has been 
relatively stable, being 4.22% p.a. in the first half of the 20
th Century compared with 4.60% 
p.a. since 1951. While, in contrast, the equity premium from average returns has increased 
substantially from 3.49% pre-1950 to 7.79% post-1950. Thus, there is a large gap between the 
dividend growth model estimate and the average return estimate over the second half of the 
20
th Century. 
[INSERT TABLE 2: AROUND HERE] 
Table 2 indicates that since 1966 the dividend growth model equity premia estimate has 
been substantially below that from average returns in all industry subsets, apart from cyclical 
consumer  goods  where  both  estimates  are  similar.  This  illustrates  that  this  divergence  
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between the equity premia estimates doesn’t appear to be due to unusual behaviour in any 
particular industry. In contrast, this phenomenon seems to be fairly widespread across almost 
every broad industry category, which suggests that perhaps a common factor is at work across 
industries and the market as a whole. Furthermore, in industries where there is a discrepancy 
the divergence between the equity premium estimates is economically substantial being at 
least 2.90% p.a. This provides further support for ex-post equity returns having been high 
since 1966 across a range of economic sectors. 
Our two main findings that a) both models yield similar estimates of the equity premium 
for the pre-1950 era and b) the equity premium from average returns increased substantially in 
the second half of the 20
th Century are entirely consistent with the Fama and French (2002) 
study of S&P 500 firms. Table 1 shows that the US equity premium estimates for 1872-1950 
are almost identical being 4.40% for the average return model and 4.17% dividend growth 
model. These figures are both around the 4% p.a. level found in this study. They also found 
the average return model estimate rose dramatically to 7.43% for the post 1951 sample from 
4.40% for the earlier period, which is comparable with our results.  
However, in one vital aspect our results are different from Fama and French’s. In the US 
the dividend growth model of the equity premium declined substantially in the second half of 
the 20
th century to 2.55% from 4.17% for their earlier sample.  In contrast, we find that this 
figure remains almost unchanged in the UK being 4.22% for 1901-1950 increasing modestly 
to 4.60% during 1951-2002.  Why are there these differences between the two markets?  
Perhaps, this is due to changes in American corporations payout policy which has not been 
fully mirrored in the UK. Fama and French (2001) demonstrate that the proportion of US 
firms that pay dividends at all declined substantially in the 1980’s and 1990’s, whilst Grullon 
and Michaely (2002) provided evidence that share repurchases have become an important 
means of distributing funds to shareholders besides dividends. Both these factors could cause 
US dividend model estimates to be biased downwards.  
However, in the UK there is little evidence to support changes in payout policy similar to 
those witnessed in the US. Ap Gwilym et al. (2004) provide evidence that the UK payout ratio  
12 
was 52.1% in December 2001, their sample end date, which was actually marginally above 
the  average  payout  ratio  of  51.4%  for  their  full  sample  1962-2001.  Furthermore,  share 
repurchases  by  British  firms  have  been  a  far  less  popular  and  important  mechanism  for 
distributing resources to stockholders in comparison to the US; firstly share repurchases were 
illegal until the mid-1980’s and even since then Rau and Vermaelen (2002) found share 
repurchase activity in the UK comprised only a very small proportion of total payout until the 
late 1990’s. Dimson and Marsh (2001, p. 23) comment  ‘Until the late 1990s (UK) share 
buybacks were negligible.’ Thus, we intimate that there has been little change in the payout 
policy of British firms. We suggest that any change in payout policy there may have been is 
unlikely to have anything other than a slight influence upon our UK dividend growth model 
results.  
An important advantage of the UK dividend growth model is that it does provide a more 
precise  estimate  of  the  equity  premium  since  the  variance  of  the  dividend  model  is 
considerably  smaller  than  that  generated  by  average  returns  especially  since  1950. 
Furthermore fundamentals are less affected by structural shifts in the economic environment 
than asset prices themselves
8. Hence, we contend that the implied equity premia derived from 
these models provide us with better estimates of expected returns than average historical 
returns.  If  this  is  the  case  then  our  results  suggest  that  the  equity  premium  puzzle  is 
considerably smaller than generally cited in financial literature. Average historical returns 
indicate equities have delivered a premium over treasury bills of approaching 8% p.a. since 
World  War  2,  however,  the  dividend  growth  model  intimates  the  true  expected  equity 
premium is closer to 4.5% p.a.  
Could investors in 1950 really have anticipated that stocks would outperform treasury bills 
by almost 8% p.a. for the rest of the century or expected capital gains to be more than 4% 
p.a.? Would they have then decided that the risks involved with stocks were too great? If not, 
then a good deal of realised stock returns are simply due to good luck, that is they were 
unexpected.  In Section 4 we tackle the question of what has caused our actual returns to 
                                                 
8 This point is explained in detail in Section 2.(ii)  
13 
diverge so far from the expected returns implied by fundamentals during the second half of 
the 20
th Century. The contention is that a large portion of these substantial capital gains was 
unanticipated at the beginning of the sample period. Valuation theory, states that this can be 
caused by either: a) the expected future growth of fundamentals being unusually high, b) 
faster growth of fundamentals than expected during the sample period or c) a decline in 
expected unconditional stock returns during the sample period. 
 
4. EXPLAINING UK EQUITY RETURNS 
 
(i) Are Post-2000 Expected Dividend Growth Rates Unusually High?  
 
It has been argued that we have entered a new economic era, which has enabled higher 
rates  of  economic  growth  to  be  attained.  One  claim  is  that  the  ever  increasing  pace  of 
technological developments has facilitated more rapid productivity growth (Jagannathan et 
al., 2001). An alternative argument is that increasing globalisation as witnessed by growing 
moves  towards  a  truly  globally  integrated  economic  system  in  which  resources  can  be 
allocated more efficiently due to previous barriers being removed and in which companies are 
able to locate production internationally in order to minimise costs. A final assertion is that 
substantial declines in inflation during the latter part of the 20
th Century in many developed 
economies  has  set  the  footing  for  higher  economic  growth  in  the  future,  economic 
policymakers have argued. These three factors – technological improvements, globalisation 
and declining inflation – have lead to hopes that higher levels of economic growth can be 
achieved and sustained long into the future. 
However, if these higher future expected growth rates had not been anticipated at the 
beginning  of  our  sample  period  then  this  would  lead  to  unexpected  capital  gains  being 
realised by investors as the potential for extended periods of high economic growth became 
known to investors and incorporated into their expectations. This hypothesis can be tested 
empirically  by  examining  the  in-sample  predictability  of  dividend  growth.  If  a  robust  
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relationship between a predictor variable and dividend growth is discovered then we can 
generate predictions for end of sample dividend growth and assess if these are unusually 
large.  
Firstly, we examine the predictability of the dividend growth rate from variables known in 
advance in a similar manner to Fama-French (2002). We first select variables which have 
been documented in the literature to have explanatory power over future returns and which 
are available for our whole sample. These are: i) the lagged dividend-price ratio 
1 1 ( ) t t D P - - , ii) 
prior returns 
1 ( ) t R -  and iii) the short-term interest rate 
1 ( ) t F - . We also include prior dividend 
growth  rates
1 ( ) t GD - .  Here  we  assess  if  they  are  able  to  predict  future  growth  rates  of 
dividends using (4). 
  1 1 1 2 1 3 2
4 3 5 1 6 2 7 3 8 1
.( ) . .
. . . . .
t t t t t
t t t t t t
GD D P GD GD
GD R R R F
a b b b
b b b b b e
- - - -
- - - - -
= + + +
+ + + + + +
  (4) 
 
We split our dataset into the pre-1950 and post-1951 sub-samples. The rationale behind 
this is that we are trying to uncover the difference in the behaviour of the equity premium 
over the first half of the 20
th century when dividend growth and average returns provided 
similar equity premium estimates and the second half of the 20
th century when these methods 
provided divergent estimates of stock returns. 
[INSERT TABLE 3: AROUND HERE] 
Panel A of Table 3 demonstrates that equation 4 can account for approximately 28% of the 
variation in one-year dividend growth during both sub-samples. However, the individual co-
efficients for all variables (except the 1 year lagged return for post 1950) are deemed to be 
statistically insignificant by the t-test. Similar results with very few individually statistically 
significant  variables  are  also  reported  for  two-year  average  dividend  growth
9.  We  also 
examine five-year average dividend growth
10. We find that for the pre-1950 period none of 
the variables are found to be statistically significant and R
2 is only 16%. However, for the 
                                                 
9 
1 1 1 2 year average dividend growth  2 [( ) ] 2 t t t t GD D D D + - - = -  
10 
4 1 1 5 year average dividend growth  5 [( ) ] 5 t t t t GD D D D + - - = -   
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post 1950 period the regression is able to explain 33% of the variation in dividend growth. 
Furthermore both the lagged dividend price ratio and one period lagged return are statistically 
significant from zero at the 1% significance level. However, the dividend-price ratio has a 
positive sign contrary to our expectation that dividends should help move the dividend-price 
ratio towards its mean value. 
The  moderate  R
2  values  obtained  but  few  statistically  significant  co-efficients  is 
symptomatic of multi-collinearity between some of the predictor variables, which would bias 
downwards  the  t-statistics.  Consequently  we  extend  our  analysis  to  consider  bi-variate 
regressions using (5), which should give us a much clearer indication of whether or not a 
relationship between the variables actually exists. We now focus individually on the dividend-
price ratio and the one period lagged dividend growth
11.  
  1
1 1 1 1
.( )
where   is  or 
t t t
t t t t
GD X
X D P GD
a b e -
- - - -
= + +   (5) 
 
In contrast with previous regression results, when we use (5) we find some statistical 
evidence of predictability using the dividend price ratio. Table 3 Panel B indicates for 1904-
1950 there is a statistically significant negative relationship between the lagged dividend-
price ratio and dividend growth at both one year and two year horizons. This is consistent 
with present value model and suggests that dividends do help the dividend-price ratio revert to 
its  mean.  What  is  more  this  parsimonious  model  can  explain  approximately  15%  of  the 
variation in dividend growth rates during this period. However, the predictive ability of the 
dividend-price ratio evaporates at longer horizons. For five-year future dividend growth, the 
dividend-price ratio becomes statistically insignificant is unable to explain any more than 2% 
of the subsequent variation in dividend growth between 1904-1950.  
Since  1951  the  dividend-price  ratio  appears  to  have  lost  any  predictive  ability  over 
dividend growth; the t-statistics become insignificant at all horizons and the co-efficient of 
                                                 
11 We also investigated the ability of lagged returns to predict future dividend growth, but the results which are 
available from the author upon request are similar to those reported for lagged dividend growth and thus in the 
interests of brevity have been omitted.  Higher order lags of both dividend growth or returns also added little 
explanatory power and individual co-efficients were insignificant.  
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determination (R
2) tends to zero. However, contrary to our expectations, at the two year and 
five year horizons the co-efficient on the dividend-price ratio is positive but insignificant. 
Thus, we find that over the past fifty years the dividend-price ratio and future dividend growth 
are essentially unrelated.  
Our results from Panel A of Table 3 did indicate that perhaps lagged dividend growth 
might be able to predict future dividend growth. Furthermore the field research of Lintner 
(1956) suggests a positive autoregressive process since dividends seem to partially adjust each 
year towards an optimal level. Table 3 Panel C reveals that over 1951-2002, this model 
performs well at both the 1 year and 2 year horizon. The B co-efficient was significant and 
positive, indicating that there is some persistence in the dividend growth rate as implied by 
the  Lintner  model.  The  model  can  account  for  a  reasonable  portion  of  dividend  growth 
variability for 1951-2002, especially at the one year horizon. Although the five year horizon 
results indicate that this element of predictability disappears at longer horizons. In contrast, 
we find no evidence of in-sample predictability over the earlier sample period, 1901-1950. 
The lagged dividend growth model performs extremely poorly with a tiny R
2 and insignificant 
co-efficients on the independent variable. Consequently, the pre-1950 data doesn’t support 
there being any link between lagged dividend growth and future dividend growth. 
[INSERT TABLE 4: AROUND HERE] 
Panel A of Table 4 reveals that at the industry level pooled regressions reveal there is no 
statistically  significant  relationship  between  the  dividend-price  ratio  and  future  dividend 
growth at any horizon post-1966
12. In fact, the model is unable to explain almost any of the 
fluctuation in the dividend growth rate. These findings are consistent with those found for the 
market as a whole reported in Table 3 Panel B. However, Panel B of Table 4 indicates that at 
the industry level there is a significant positive relationship between lagged dividend growth 
and future dividend at the two-year and five-year horizons.  Nevertheless, lagged dividends 
are unable to predict more than 2% of the variation of future dividend growth at any horizon.  
                                                 
12 We can report that within groups estimation of the panel data yielded similar results to those presented here.  
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Overall, our results indicate that at longer horizons of five-years or more dividend growth 
is essentially unpredictable. Individually, neither the lagged dividend-price ratio nor lagged 
dividends are able to explain a substantive proportion of future dividend growth at the five-
year horizon. In this case it would appear that the historical average rate of dividend growth is 
likely  to  be the best predictor of future dividend growth. Since 1951, we know this has 
averaged 1.39% p.a., which is not exceptionally high and we find no evidence to suggest that 
future long-term dividend growth is liable to be extraordinarily rapid.  
Even at shorter horizons, where we do detect a significant in-sample relationship between 
dividend  growth  and  lagged  dividend  growth,  this  model  does  not  indicate  that  future 
dividend growth is anticipated to be high.  At the market level, dividend growth was below its 
historical  average  during  the  sample  end  years  of  2000,  2001  and  2002,  consequently 
extrapolating into the future using the regression results from (5) would imply future dividend 
growth was anticipated to be below average
13. Our evidence indicates that the outlook for 
dividend growth in December 2002 can at best be expected to equal the historical average 
dividend growth rate. However, in the short-term rational agents might anticipate dividend 
growth to be even below the historical average. Therefore, we find no evidence whatsoever to 
support the hypothesis that future UK dividend growth is expected to be exceptionally high. 
Consequently, we suggest that the deviation between expected returns implied by dividend 
growth and average returns must have been caused by a factor other than the anticipation of 
extraordinarily rapid dividend growth in the post 2002 period. 
 
(ii) Is Dividend Growth 1951-2002 Unexpectedly High?  
 
If dividend growth in the second half of the 20
th Century had been above expectations 
formed in 1950 then this would lead to an unanticipated rise in equity prices. However, even 
if in-sample growth had been extraordinarily large then the expected return estimates from 
                                                 
13 We can report that end-of-sample forecasts from lagged returns at either the one or two year horizon prove to be 
negative as well for 2000-2002, further supporting a poor outlook for short-run future dividend growth in 2002.  
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fundamentals would also have been large and prices would have responded to this. Had the 
dividend-price ratio been the same in 2002 as in 1951 (or 1901) the estimates of both models 
would have been almost equal.  
In the UK, we find that dividend growth showed an increase during the latter part of the 
20
th century. Real dividend growth was 0.56% over the period 1901-1950, increasing to an 
average rate of 1.39% from 1951-2002. However, the magnitude of the increase is sensitive to 
the inclusion of 1901 in the pre-1950 sample. Between 1902-1950 the real dividend growth 
rate was 1.18%, just a modest 0.21% below the rate observed post-1950. How much of this 
increase in dividend growth could have been expected? This is an important issue which can 
be tested directly and analysed in much more detail through out-of sample forecasting tests.  
Out of sample forecasting is useful if we are concerned with investors’ expectations at a 
particular point in time during the sample. For example, an investor in 1950 only has pre-
1950  information  at  his  disposal  in  which  to  forecast  dividend  growth  for  1951. 
Consequently, out of sample tests also allow us to examine if the dividend growth element of 
estimates of the equity premium 1951-2002 are close to what investors could have reasonably 
expected in 1950. In this respect the out of sample tests act as a robustness check for the 
accuracy of our equity premia estimates.  
Out of sample tests will also provide an opportunity to test the claims made by Fama and 
French (2002, p. 651) that the  ‘historical mean growth rate (of dividends) is a near optimal 
forecast of future growth.’ We test if these claims made by Fama and French hold for the UK 
market  by  investigating  the  out-of-sample  forecasting  power  of  the  average  historical 
dividend growth rate compared to the dividend-price ratio and lagged dividend growth
14. We 
conduct out-of-sample forecasts for both one-year real dividend growth ( t GD ) and two-year 
average real dividend growth ( t GD2 ) at the market level, since this was the only evidence of 
in-sample predictability discovered in Section 4.(i). Throughout, our analysis is based purely 
on data available to the investor at time t.   
                                                 
14 A lagged return model and a random-walk model were also examined. The return model results are similar to 
the lagged dividend growth model. The results for both these models are available from the authors upon request.  
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The historical growth rate model simply expects that next periods dividend growth rate is 
equal to the mean of all previous dividend growth rates:  1 ( )     1902,...., t t E GD GD t T + = =  
For the dividend-price and lagged dividend models we use a two-step process to generate 
out-of-sample forecasts. Firstly, we estimate the time-varying co-efficients of the model using 
a rolling regression technique given by (6). A window length covering twenty years of annual 
data is employed to enable credible estimations of  & t t a b  to be derived
15. The earliest co-
efficient estimation is for 1903-1922; we then use (7) to produce forecasts of dividend growth 
for each year from 1923.  
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Our  estimation  equation  (6)  reveals  that  there  is  in  fact  substantial  time-variation  in 
b from both models, which is illustrated graphically in figure 3. The dividend-price ratio 
should be negatively related to future dividend growth. If the dividend-price ratio is above its 
mean then future dividend growth should be below average to guide it back to equilibrium. At 
both the one year and two year horizon, we find that  b  on the dividend-price ratio does tend 
to be negative as predicted by theory, particularly up until the mid-1950’s
16. However,  b  
tends to move towards 0 as the sample period progresses, indicating that the relationship 
between the lagged dividend-price ratio and dividend growth weakens over the sample period. 
At the one year horizon though  b  remains negative until 1998. However, at the two year 
horizon since the late-1950’s b  often has a perverse sign if of small magnitude. 
                                                 
15 Consequently our datastream sample is a little too short to effectively assess the forecasting power of various 
models and we thus focus purely on the Barclays market data.  
16 Our in-sample results found Bt on Dt/Pt to be significantly negative for the 1902-1950 period.  
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[INSERT FIGURE 3: AROUND HERE] 
Previous  dividend  growth  should  be  positively  related  to  future  dividend  growth. 
Dividends tend to adjust only slowly over time and managers only tend to increase dividends 
at a rate they believe to be sustainable (Lintner, 1956). Figure 3A indicates that prior to 1940, 
b  on dividend growth was negative at both the one year and the two year horizon contrary to 
our expectations. At the one year horizonb on dividend growth was positive in each sample 
ending period since 1940, whereas at the two-year horizon  b tends to be small and close to 
zero during the period 1940-1980. However, at both horizons  b is clearly positive and most 
persistent from the mid-1980’s onwards.  
 [INSERT TABLE 5 AND TABLE 6: AROUND HERE] 
For the whole sample period 1923-2002, we find that the mean error for all models was 
positive. This demonstrates that these forecasting tools suggest that average annual dividend 
growth was lower than our models predicted and could have been expected to be up to 0.57% 
p.a. higher than it actually was! Considering that average dividend growth only averaged 
0.98% p.a. for 1901-2002, this is quite a substantial amount. This suggests that rather than 
being phenomenally high, dividend growth was actually lower than expected during 1923-
2002. 
In terms of actual forecasting accuracy at the one year horizon, we find that the historical 
average model provides the most accurate forecasts over the full sample period of 1923-2002. 
It has the lowest mean-squared error and the lowest mean absolute error of 55.60% and 5.92% 
respectively. The regression based forecasting models had very similar performance in terms 
of overall accuracy. In terms of mean-squared error the dividend-price model fared best with 
61.47% followed by the dividend model with 63.99%, whilst in terms of mean absolute error 
both had very similar accuracy
17.   
However,  when  we  split  the  sample  into  two  sub-periods  a  slightly  different  picture 
emerges. For 1923-1950, the dividend-price model provides the most accurate one step ahead 
                                                 
17 A random walk model was also estimated but performed poorly. Results are available from the author upon 
request.  
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dividend growth forecasts. It’s mean squared error of 53.82% is much smaller than that of the 
other models and its mean absolute error of 6.20% is also the lowest. The historical average 
model is second best whilst the dividend model produces relatively poor forecasts. Over 
1951-2002, the historical average model provides the lowest forecast errors in terms of both 
mean squared error and mean absolute error. The dividend model follows closely behind, 
although it is perhaps surprising that the historical average model performs so well relative to 
the dividend model, when this regression model had demonstrated in-sample predictability 
over the 1951-2002 period. The dividend-price model provides the worst forecasts in terms of 
both mean squared error and mean absolute error for 1951-2002.  
A crucial remaining issue is identifying if the forecasting accuracy of a particular model is 
statistically distinguishable from that of any other? This can be tested now by the Diebold-
Mariano test (1995) developed under the null hypothesis that forecast a and forecast b are 
equally accurate forecasts. Our two sets of forecast errors eat and ebt provide the same quality 
of forecasts if E| dt | = 0, where dt =   eat
2 - ebt
2 under the mean-squared error criterion. The test 
statistic is  ￿ 1/2
1 [ ( )] S V d d
- = , which follows a standard normal distribution. Harvey, Leybourne 
and  Newbold  (1997)  advocate  modifying  the  Diebold-Mariano  test  to  improve  its  finite 
sample  performance.  Their  modification  improves  the  estimation  of  the  variance  of  d , 
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ahead that are forecast. This new statistic, which follows the t-distribution, is confirmed by 
monte-carlo simulations to perform better than the original Diebold-Mariano statistic. 
We  use  Harvey  et  al.’s  (1997)  modified  Diebold-Mariano  test  for  which  results  are 
reported in Panel A of Table 6. These tests indicate that at the one-year horizon the historical 
average model, which had the lowest mean-squared error, provides statistically significantly 
better forecasts than the dividend model for the full sample and for 1923-1950. However, the 
dividend-price model is found to provide forecasts that are statistically as accurate as the 
historical average, both for the full sample period and for 1923-1950 but are inferior for 1951-
2002. The dividend-price model provides better forecasts than the dividend model for 1923- 
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1950, but the dividend model provides better forecasts than the dividend-price model for 
1951-2002.  
At  the  one-year  horizon  our  results  indicate  that  firstly  there  is  statistically  no  better 
forecaster than the historical average model in any sample period. Secondly that investors in 
1951 would know that the dividend growth model provides worst forecasts than the other 
models  and  thirdly  it  should  have  become  clear  to  market  participants  by  2002  that  the 
dividend-price ratio is no longer a useful forecaster of future dividend growth.   
At the two-year horizon, Panel B of Table 5 reveals that the historical average model has 
the smallest mean-squared error and also the lowest mean absolute error both in the full 
sample and in the two sub-samples. On both criteria the dividend model is second best for the 
full sample and 1951-2001, although in terms of the mean-squared errors the dividend-price 
model is better than the dividend model over 1923-1950.  
Panel B of Table 6 shows that in terms of the modified Diebold-Mariano tests over 1923-
1950 all models are found to produce equally accurate forecasts at the two-year horizon. 
However, the historical average model is found to produce statistically superior forecasts to 
the dividend-price and dividend models for both the full sample period and 1951-2001. These 
results suggest that investors’ looking to forecast dividend growth over the medium to long-
term in 2001 should use the historical average model because it produces statistically better 
forecasts than the other models.  
Our results support the hypothesis that there is no better forecaster of future dividend 
growth than its historical average. For forecasts of dividend growth at both the one year and 
two year horizon over the full sample the historical average model had the lowest mean-
squared  error  and  mean  absolute  error.  Even  during  sub-periods,  such  as  for  1923-1950 
forecasts of one year dividend growth when the dividend-price model provided the lowest 
performance statistics, the statistical test of equal performance failed to reject the null that 
both the dividend-price and the historical average model provided forecasts of equal quality. 
Consequently our results broadly support Fama and French’s supposition that the historical 
average is the best forecaster of future dividend growth.  
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The historical average market dividend growth rate stood at 1.2% p.a. in 1951, it was 
almost unchanged in 2002 nudging marginally higher to 1.3% p.a. The growth rate for 1951-
2002 was 1.4% p.a. Thus, although the actual dividend growth rate might have been above 
investors’  expectations,  it  was  only  by  a  negligible  amount.  This  also  suggests  that  the 
contention of our model that ex-post dividend growth estimated from 1951-2002 data was 
very close to what investors’ would have reasonably expected in 1950. Thus we find further 
support  for  our  dividend  growth  model  (2)  and  its  assertion  that  the  true  ex-ante  equity 
premium was considerably below the ex-post equity premium over 1951-2002. 
 
(iii) Have Expected Stock Returns Fallen During 1951-2002? 
 
There are a number of reasons to suggest that the cost of equity capital has fallen over 
recent decades. For example, increasing openness and integration of international financial 
markets  has  perhaps  enabled  investors  to  seriously  consider  investing  in  countries  they 
would’ve been reluctant to supply funds to 30 or 40 years ago (Stulz, 1999). In addition, 
greater  opportunities  for  portfolio  diversification  also  now  exist  due  to  developments  in 
futures and derivatives markets. Bansal and Lundblad (2002) provide evidence that there has 
been a decline in the conditional volatility of global real cashflow growth rates indicating that 
the ex ante risk premium on the global market portfolio has dropped considerably. Another 
factor which may affect expected returns is the decline in transaction costs as pointed out by 
Aiyagari and Gertler (1993) and Jones (2000), which has effectively lowered the rate of return 
demanded by investors. 
We  examine  dividend-price  ratios  to  assess  if,  in  fact,  there  has  been  any  permanent 
change in the level of expected returns. Figure 1 shows that there does appear to have been a 
declining trend in the UK Barclays Dividend-price ratio since the 1980’s. In every year since 
1992 the UK Barclays dividend-price ratio has been below its historical average of 4.42%, 
reaching a post-war low of 2.06% in 1999. However, the decline in the UK dividend-price 
ratio does not appear to be as clearly prevalent or severe as the decline of the US dividend- 
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price ratio. For example, Fama and French’s sample finished in 2000, at which point the S&P 
500 dividend-price ratio was at an all-time minima of 1.1% and even by the end of 2002 it 
had remained below 1.5%. Our conjecture is that part of the decline in the US dividend-price 
ratio can be assigned to a change in the payout policy of American firms that has not been 
paralleled by their British counterparts
18. Nevertheless, it appears that since the early 1990’s 
both the UK and the US dividend-price ratio have been fluctuating around a lower mean 
value. This is indicative that, in fact, the discount rate has fallen. 
To test if there has been a permanent fall in the UK dividend-price ratio, we employ the 
Andrews-Quandt structural stability test. The Andrews-Quandt test assumes the break date is 
unknown, and calculates the Chow test for every possible break date
19, selecting the break 
date that maximises the F-test statistic. The null hypothesis is that there is no structural break, 
which for our application we are testing if there is any change in the mean of the dividend-
price ratio.  
As alluded to in section 2.(iii) there are several outlying observations in the Barclays 
dividend-price ratio. Outliers can seriously damage the ability of structural break tests to 
correctly detect the true date of the change. Therefore the dividend-price series which has the 
effects of these outliers neutralised (DPDUM), as outlined in (3) is used in our structural 
break tests. For our industry data we also correct for the 1974 outlier, induced by the first 
OPEC oil price shock  using the same method as in (3). 
[INSERT TABLE 7: AROUND HERE]  
[INSERT FIGURE 4: AROUND HERE] 
Panel A of Table 7 reveals that the Andrews-Quandt test fails to detect a significant break 
in  the  mean  of  the  dividend-price  ratio  during the period 1902-1951. However, over the 
period 1952-2002, 1992 is selected as the break date with a p-value of 0.00, indicating that 
there has been a permanent decline in the mean of the dividend-price ratio series. Inspection 
of figure 4, demonstrates the line of best-fit given by (11) for the Barclays dividend-price 
                                                 
18 This issue is discussed in more detail in Section 3 
19 The first and last 15% of observations are excluded in order that erroneous breaks are not found.  
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series fits the data well. This evidence lends support to the hypothesis that expected returns 
have fallen. The break tests indicate a downward shift in the mean of the dividend-price ratio 
by approximately 1.5% (the value of B), which is economically substantial particularly given 
the previous mean of the dividend-price ratio was about 4.5%. 
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Dividend-price ratio with 1993 break 1993









  (8) 
 
This finding is consistent with the study of Carlson, Pelz and Wohar (2002) who find 
support for a single break in the US quarterly dividend-price ratio during the early 1990’s. 
Since the timing of the breaks in both markets coincide almost exactly this is suggestive that 
perhaps there were common factors at work in both markets that lead to such shifts.  
[INSERT FIGURE 5: AROUND HERE] 
Panel B of Table 7 suggests the timing of the downward mean break of the Datastream 
market dividend-price ratio is almost exactly the same as that using the Barclays Data being 
just one year later in 1993. We also find support for a statistically significant downward mean 
break in a majority of the industry dividend-price ratios. In four of the eight industries this 
occured in 1992 or 1993, while the non-cyclical consumer goods industry had a statistically 
significant downward break after 1984, a little before the market as a whole.  
Dividend-price ratio with 1994 break 1994
1994  is 0 for t   1993 and 1 for t   1994.
i i DU
DU
a b = +
£ ³
      (9) 
 
In figure 5 we plot the industry dividend-price ratios with fitted lines given by (12) which 
impose a downward mean break following 1993. The timing is chosen to coincide with the 
break  date  of  the  Datastream  market  dividend-price  ratio.    In  all  industries  the  break  is 
downward as expected. Only in the cases of general industries and cyclical consumer goods 
does visual inspection of figure 5 suggest that they haven’t moved to a lower mean by the end 
of the sample period, particularly when compared to the 1970’s and 1980’s. However, only 
the behaviour of the general industries sector is erroneous since the finding of no clear break  
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in the cyclical consumer goods dividend-price ratio is precisely what we should expect given 
that this was the single industry for which the dividend growth and average return model 
produced similar return estimates. 
Our evidence broadly supports the notion that future cashflows are being discounted by 
investors at a lower rate. This case is strongest for the market indices as a whole, however we 
generally find support for this supposition at the industry level as well. If the discount rate has 
fallen then rationally valued equities would witness a run-up in prices during the late 20
th 
Century, due to factors not anticipated by investors
20. Consequently realised historical returns 
could be substantially above investors expectations and the true ex-ante equity premia might 
be considerably below the 6-8% estimates based upon historical average returns.  
We propose this fall in expected returns could potentially be attributed to several factors: 
greater  openness  of  international  financial  markets,  increased  opportunities  for  portfolio 
diversification or declining transaction and information costs. We leave the avenue open for 
further research to attempt to pinpoint the exact cause of the decline in expected returns. Our 
main conclusion is purely that there is good reason to believe that expected stock returns have 
declined  towards  the  end  of  the  20
th
  Century.  Such  a  decline  in  expected  returns  could 
rationally explain why stock prices rose so rapidly during the 1990’s and why realised returns 
over the period 1951-2000 have exceeded investors’ expected returns as proxied for by the 




The empirical work in this paper suggests that the annual expected market equity premium 
was most likely to be in the region of 4.60%, our estimate of the dividend growth model 
rather than the 7.79% investors’ actually received. We document for the overall market that 
the  pace  of  capital  gains  has  been  dramatically  higher  since  1951  than  the  period  prior 
                                                 
20 Since if there is a fall in expected returns then future payoffs are discounted at a lower rate meaning that the 
price of the asset must rise. If the fall in expected returns is unanticipated; the price rise is simply good fortune 
caused by the decline in expected returns.  
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preceding 1950. Our industry data also indicates that capital gains have been high since 1966 
across economic sectors, with 6 of the 8 industries reporting an annual rate of capital gain of 
above  4%.  Such  large  capital  gains  are  thought  to  have  been  largely  unanticipated  by 
economic agents and certainly it cannot be justified by in-sample growth of dividends over 
the latter part of the 20
th Century.   
We contend that the average stock return over the latter part of the 20
th Century was above 
investors’ expectations and investigate if this was due to either a) expectations of higher 
growth rates of fundamentals post-2002 or b) a decline in the discount rate. Some evidence of 
in-sample dividend growth predictability at one or two year horizons is discovered. Since 
1951, lagged dividend growth is found to be significantly and positively related to dividend 
growth at the market level. However, since 2000 dividend growth has been below its long-run 
average;  thus,  this  model  suggests  investors  should  expect  lower  than  average  dividend 
growth in the future. At the industry level pooled regressions indicate only a tiny portion of 
future dividend growth can be predicted in-sample. Out-of-sample the historical dividend 
growth  rate  is  the  best  forecaster  of  future  dividend  growth,  especially  since  1951  and 
especially for horizons longer than one year. Since the historical dividend growth is the best 
forecaster then investors should expect dividend growth rates to be approximately the same as 
in the past. In short, we find no evidence whatsoever to support the view that future dividend 
growth should be any higher than its historical average. 
We do find support for the hypothesis that expected returns have fallen. There does appear 
to have been a permanent decline in the market dividend-price ratio as identified by the 
structural  stability  tests.  Our  evidence  also  suggests  that  this  occurred  across  a  range  of 
economic  sub-sectors,  rather  than  simply  being  confined  to  or  caused  by  extraordinary 
behaviour in a single industry. This indicates that the expected unconditional equity return has 
fallen. We propose that this is the primary cause of the high level of capital growth witnessed 
in recent decades, which we believe to have been largely unanticipated by potential investors.  
An important implication is that unless UK investors believe that valuation ratios will fall 
substantially again, they should expect lower returns in the future.  
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Table 1: UK & US Market Estimates of Equity Premia and Related Statistics    
                                
Panel A: UK Market Estimates of Equity Premia and Related Statistics             
                                
UK Data  Variable  Inft  Ft  Dt / Pt-1   GDt  GPt   RDt   Rt   RXDt  RXt  
                                
1901-2002  Mean  4.21  1.18  4.62  0.98  2.25  5.60  6.87  4.41  5.68 
   St. Dev  6.96  6.54  1.21  16.12  19.80  16.41  20.47  17.37  21.02 
                                
1901-1950  Mean  2.20  0.82  4.48  0.56  -0.17  5.03  4.31  4.22  3.49 
   St. Dev  8.07  8.49  0.98  22.00  14.43  22.34  14.93  23.70  15.27 
                                
1951-2002  Mean  6.14  1.53  4.75  1.39  4.57  6.14  9.33  4.60  7.79 
   St. Dev  5.06  3.89  1.39  7.04  23.77  7.28  24.56  7.59  25.34 
                                
1966-2002  Mean  6.97  2.09  4.60  0.49  4.28  5.09  8.88  3.00  6.79 
   St. Dev  5.44  3.95  1.54  6.82  24.69  7.04  25.57  7.20  26.56 
                                
Panel B: US Market Estimates of Equity Premia and Related Statistics             
                                
US Data  Variable  Inft  Ft  Dt / Pt-1   GDt  GPt   RDt   Rt   RXDt  RXt  
                                
1872-2000  Mean  2.16  3.24  4.70  2.08  4.11  6.78  8.81  3.54  5.57 
   St. Dev  7.51  8.48  1.39  12.37  17.83  12.56  18.03  13.00  18.51 
                                
1872-1950  Mean  0.99  3.90  5.34  2.74  2.96  8.07  8.30  4.17  4.40 
   St. Dev  9.11  10.63  1.12  15.28  18.48  15.41  18.72  16.02  19.57 
                                
1951-2000  Mean  4.00  2.19  3.70  1.05  5.92  4.74  9.62  2.55  7.43 




All values reported are annual percentages. Panel A covers UK Data from the Barclays Equity-Gilt Study. Panel 
B covers US Data reported in Fama & French (2002). Inft is the rate of inflation for year t, (CPIt / CPIt-1) – 1. Ft 
is the real return on Treasury Bills. dt and pt are nominal dividends and prices at time t. Dt / Pt-1 is the real 
dividend yield, defined as: (dt / pt-1)*(CPIt-1 / CPIt). GDt is the real growth of dividends for t, (dt / dt-1)*(CPIt-1 / 
CPIt) – 1. GPt is the real capital gain for t, (pt / pt-1)*(CPIt-1 / CPIt). RDt is the dividend growth model estimate of 
equity returns for t, (Dt / Pt-1) + GDt. RXDt is the dividend growth model estimate of the equity premium for t, 




Table 2: UK Industry estimates of Equity Premia and Related Statistics 1966-2002    
                                
                                
Industry  Variable  Inft  Ft  Dt / Pt-1   GDt  GPt   RDt   Rt   RXDt  RXt  
                                
                                
Total Market  Mean  7.03  1.61  4.62  1.22  5.00  5.84  9.62  4.24  8.02 
   St. Dev  5.41  3.89  1.32  6.56  24.55  6.63  25.27  6.08  26.10 
                                
Resources                       Mean  7.03  1.61  5.15  2.28  7.10  7.43  12.25  5.82  10.64 
   St. Dev  5.41  3.89  1.81  15.93  31.95  16.33  32.88  16.38  33.65 
                                
Basic  Mean  7.03  1.61  5.31  -1.31  2.18  4.00  7.49  2.39  5.89 
Industries                  St. Dev  5.41  3.89  1.31  9.77  26.95  9.51  27.69  8.81  28.60 
                                
General                Mean  7.03  1.61  4.42  0.56  4.20  4.98  8.63  3.37  7.02 
Industrials  St. Dev  5.41  3.89  1.47  7.15  27.81  6.82  28.71  6.59  30.08 
                                
Cyclical            Mean  7.03  1.61  5.64  0.86  0.64  6.51  6.28  4.90  4.67 
Consumer goods  St. Dev  5.41  3.89  2.15  14.37  30.73  14.58  31.64  14.82  32.25 
                                
Non-Cyclical        Mean  7.03  1.61  4.54  2.90  7.02  7.44  11.56  5.83  9.96 
Consumer goods  St. Dev  5.41  3.89  1.40  6.68  25.83  6.60  26.45  5.86  26.95 
                                
Cyclical                  Mean  7.03  1.61  4.25  0.52  4.24  4.78  8.50  3.17  6.89 
Services  St. Dev  5.41  3.89  1.37  6.61  23.27  6.39  23.92  5.96  24.88 
                                
Non-Cyclical              Mean  7.03  1.61  3.37  8.00  12.25  11.37  15.62  9.77  14.01 
Services  St. Dev  5.41  3.89  1.22  28.48  35.19  29.00  35.70  28.50  36.06 
                                
Financials                       Mean  7.03  1.61  4.72  3.22  6.12  7.94  10.83  6.33  9.23 
   St. Dev  5.41  3.89  1.30  5.86  26.10  5.72  26.70  4.64  27.29 
 
Notes: 
All values reported are annual percentages. Inft is the rate of inflation for year t, (CPIt / CPIt-1) – 1. Ft is the real 
return on Treasury Bills. dt and pt are nominal dividends and prices at time t. Dt / Pt-1 is the real dividend yield, 
defined as: (dt / pt-1)*(CPIt-1 / CPIt). GDt is the real growth of dividends for t, (dt / dt-1)*(CPIt-1 / CPIt) – 1. GPt is 
the real capital gain for t, (pt / pt-1)*(CPIt-1 / CPIt). RDt is the dividend growth model estimate of equity returns 
for t, (Dt / Pt-1) + GDt. RXDt is the dividend growth model estimate of the equity premium for t, RDt -Ft. Rt is the 




Table 3: In-sample Predictability of the Real Dividend Growth Rate Using Barclays Data
Panel A: Predicting Dividend Growth with all Potential Predictor Variables
Sample Period: Pre-1950
Y Sample Variable Constant Dt-1 / Pt-1 GDt-1 GDt-2 GDt-3 Rt-1 Rt-2 Rt-3 Ft-1 R
2
F
GDt 1904-1950 Coefficient 0.14 -5.22 -0.17 -0.12 -0.31 0.17 0.24 0.07 0.03 0.28 1.81
t-value 0.72 -1.17 -0.91 -0.63 -1.95 0.76 1.01 0.32 1.61 [0.105]
GD2t 1904-1950 Coefficient 0.04 -1.07 -0.17 -0.24 -0.16 0.26 0.19 0.05 -0.08 0.26 1.64
t-value 0.27 -0.33 -1.29 -1.74 -1.31 1.69 0.87 0.36 -0.20 [0.147]
GD5t 1904-1950 Coefficient -0.01 -0.42 -0.05 -0.07 -0.03 0.12 0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.16 0.88
t-value -0.15 -0.29 -0.82 -1.03 -0.52 1.74 0.17 -0.52 1.56 [0.539]
Sample Period: Post-1951
Y Sample Variable Constant Dt-1 / Pt-1 GDt-1 GDt-2 GDt-3 Rt-1 Rt-2 Rt-3 Ft-1 R
2
F
GDt 1951-2002 Coefficient -0.04 0.97 0.19 0.04 -0.10 0.13 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.28 2.13
t-value -0.73 0.99 1.15 0.28 -0.74 2.45 1.27 0.20 -0.78 [0.053]
GD2t 1951-2001 Coefficient -0.08 1.92 0.09 -0.09 0.04 0.14 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.25 1.77
t-value -1.70 2.08 0.60 -0.68 0.35 2.84 1.41 0.68 -0.81 [0.111]
GD5t 1951-1998 Coefficient -0.14 2.88 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.12 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.33 2.35
t-value -3.53 3.81 0.11 0.90 0.58 3.24 1.84 0.76 -0.04 [0.036]*
Notes:
The regression intercept is constant and t-value is the regression co-efficient divided by its standard error.
The nominal value of the equity price index and the nominal dividend paid at the end of year t are dt and pt. The price level at the end of year t is CPIt.
The real one year dividend growth rate for year t is GDt = (dt/dt-1)*(CPIt-1/CPIt)-1. 
The real two-year average dividend growth rate is GD2t = [(dt+1/dt-1)*(CPIt-1/CPIt+1)-1]/2
The real five-year average dividend growth rate is GD5t = [(dt+4/dt-1)*(CPIt-1/CPIt+4)-1]/5  





Table 3 (continued): In-sample Predictability of the Real Dividend Growth Rate Using Barclays Data
Panel B: Predicting Dividend Growth with the Dividend-Price ratio
Sample Period: Pre-1950 Sample Period: Post-1951
Y Sample Variable Constant Dt-1 / Pt-1 R
2
F Y Sample Variable Constant Dt-1 / Pt-1 R
2
F
GDt 1904-1950 Coefficient 0.36 -7.95 0.15 8.78 GDt 1951-2002 Coefficient 0.04 -0.66 0.01 0.65
t-value 2.93 -2.96 [0.005]** t-value 1.15 -0.81 [0.423]
GD2t 1904-1950 Coefficient 0.25 -5.32 0.14 7.50 GD2t 1951-2001 Coefficient 0.01 0.16 0.00 0.05
t-value 2.77 -2.74 [0.009]** t-value 0.24 0.23 [0.817]
GD5t 1904-1950 Coefficient 0.04 -0.97 0.02 1.15 GD5t 1951-1998 Coefficient -0.03 1.01 0.06 3.16
t-value 1.07 -1.07 [0.290] t-value -1.10 1.78 [0.082]
Panel C: Predicting Dividend Growth with lagged Dividend Growth
Sample Period: Pre-1950 Sample Period: Post-1951
Y Sample Variable Constant GDt-1 R
2
F Y Sample Variable Constant GDt-1 R
2
F
GDt 1904-1950 Coefficient 0.02 -0.18 0.03 1.52 GDt 1951-2002 Coefficient 0.01 0.36 0.13 7.26
t-value 0.48 -1.23 [0.224] t-value 0.939 2.69 [0.010]**
GD2t 1904-1950 Coefficient 0.01 -0.14 0.04 2.05 GD2t 1951-2001 Coefficient 0.01 0.22 0.07 3.51
t-value 0.51 -1.43 [0.159] t-value 1.43 1.87 [0.067]
GD5t 1904-1950 Coefficient 0.00 -0.04 0.02 0.73 GD5t 1951-1998 Coefficient 0.01 0.12 0.03 1.54
t-value 0.17 -0.85 [0.398] t-value 2.22 1.24 [0.221]
Notes:
The regression intercept is constant and t-value is the regression co-efficient divided by its standard error.
The nominal value of the equity price index and the nominal dividend paid at the end of year t are dt and pt. The price level at the end of year t is CPIt.
The real one year dividend growth rate for year t is GDt = (dt/dt-1)*(CPIt-1/CPIt)-1. 
The real two-year average dividend growth rate is GD2t = [(dt+1/dt-1)*(CPIt-1/CPIt+1)-1]/2
The real five-year average dividend growth rate is GD5t = [(dt+4/dt-1)*(CPIt-1/CPIt+4)-1]/5  




Table 4: In-sample Predictability of Real Dividend Growth Using Panel Industry Data 
                          
Panel A: Pooled OLS Regression of 8 Industries Predicting Dividend Growth with the Dividend-Price Ratio 
                            
Sample Period: Post-1966                    
Y  Sample  Variable  Constant  Dt-1 / Pt-1     R
2          
GDt  1966-2002  Coefficient  0.02  -0.02     0.00         
      t-value  2.31  -0.74               
                           
GD2t  1966-2001  Coefficient  0.02  0.03     0.00         
      t-value  2.01  1.58               
                          
GD5t  1966-1998  Coefficient  0.03  -0.03     0.00         
      t-value  1.81  -0.54               
                           
Panel B: Pooled OLS Regression of 8 Industries Predicting Dividend Growth with lagged Dividend Growth 
                            
Sample Period: Post-1966                     
Y  Sample  Variable  Constant  GDt-1     R
2          
GDt  1966-2002  Coefficient  0.02  -0.07     0.01          
      t-value  2.52  -0.55               
                           
GD2t  1966-2001  Coefficient  0.02  0.14     0.02          
      t-value  2.21  4.36               
                          
GD5t  1966-1998  Coefficient  0.02  0.11     0.02          
      t-value  1.77  3.98               
 
Notes: 
The regression intercept is constant and t-value is the regression co-efficient divided by its standard error. The 
nominal value of the equity price index and the nominal dividend paid at the end of year t are dt and pt. The price 
level at the end of year t is CPIt.  The real one year dividend growth rate for year t is GDt = (dt/dt-1)*(CPIt-1/CPIt)-
1. The real two-year average dividend growth rate is GD2t = [(dt+1/dt-1)*(CPIt-1/CPIt+1)-1]/2. The real five-year 
average dividend growth rate is GD5t = [(dt+4/dt-1)*(CPIt-1/CPIt+4)-1]/5. Dt-1 / Pt-1 is the real dividend-price ratio at 






Table 5: Barclays Annual Data: Forecasting Dividend Growth
Panel A: Forecasting Performance of Models: One Year Dividend Growth
1923-2002
Statistic Dividend-Price Model Dividend Model Historical Av. Model
Mean Squared Error 61.47% 63.99% 55.60%
Mean Error 0.57% 0.46% 0.31%
Mean Absolute Error 6.37% 6.27% 5.92%
Root Mean Squared Error 7.84% 8.00% 7.46%
1923-1950
Statistic Dividend-Price Model Dividend Model Historical Av. Model
Mean Squared Error 53.82% 82.41% 67.17%
Mean Error 1.86% 1.63% 0.86%
Mean Absolute Error 6.20% 6.86% 6.55%
Root Mean Squared Error 7.34% 9.08% 8.20%
1951-2002
Statistic Dividend-Price Model Dividend Model Historical Av. Model
Mean Squared Error 65.58% 52.90% 49.37%
Mean Error -0.13% -0.14% 0.01%
Mean Absolute Error 6.46% 5.86% 5.58%
Root Mean Squared Error 8.10% 7.27% 7.03%
Panel B: Forecasting Performance of Models: Two Year Dividend Growth
1923-2001
Statistic Dividend-Price Model Dividend Model Historical Av. Model
Mean Squared Error 63.49% 47.16% 37.35%
Mean Error 0.46% 0.52% 0.22%
Mean Absolute Error 6.31% 5.46% 5.02%
Root Mean Squared Error 7.97% 6.87% 6.11%
1923-1950
Statistic Dividend-Price Model Dividend Model Historical Av. Model
Mean Squared Error 50.31% 54.50% 39.62%
Mean Error 1.37% 1.44% 0.82%
Mean Absolute Error 6.04% 5.59% 5.06%
Root Mean Squared Error 7.09% 7.38% 6.29%
1951-2001
Statistic Dividend-Price Model Dividend Model Historical Av. Model
Mean Squared Error 70.73% 43.12% 36.10%
Mean Error -0.03% 0.01% -0.11%
Mean Absolute Error 6.45% 5.39% 5.00%







Table 6: Barclays Annual Data: Forecasting Dividend Growth
Panel A: Modified Diebold Mariano Tests of Equal Forecast Accuracy: One Year Dividend Growth
Sample Model 1 Model 2 Test Statistic Critical Value Inference
1923-2002 Historical Dividend -1.83 -1.67 Historical model is more accurate
1923-1950 Historical Dividend -1.70 -1.70 Historical model is more accurate
1951-2002 Historical Dividend -0.84 -1.70 Both models have equal accuracy
Sample Model 1 Model 2 Test Statistic Critical Value Inference
1923-2002 Historical Dividend-Price -0.88 -1.67 Both models have equal accuracy
1923-1950 Historical Dividend-Price 1.02 -1.70 Both models have equal accuracy
1951-2002 Historical Dividend-Price -2.25 -1.70 Historical model is more accurate
Sample Model 1 Model 2 Test Statistic Critical Value Inference
1923-2002 Dividend Dividend-Price 0.23 -1.67 Both models have equal accuracy
1923-1950 Dividend-Price Dividend -1.72 -1.70 Dividend-Price model is more accurate
1951-2002 Dividend Dividend-Price -1.77 -1.70 Dividend model is more accurate
Panel B: Modified Diebold Mariano Tests of Equal Forecast Accuracy: Two Year Dividend Growth
Sample Model 1 Model 2 Test Statistic Critical Value Inference
1923-2001 Historical Dividend -2.37 -1.67 Historical model is more accurate
1923-1950 Historical Dividend -1.45 -1.70 Both models have equal accuracy
1951-2001 Historical Dividend -2.29 -1.70 Historical model is more accurate
Sample Model 1 Model 2 Test Statistic Critical Value Inference
1923-2001 Historical Dividend-Price -2.13 -1.67 Historical model is more accurate
1923-1950 Historical Dividend-Price 0.43 -1.70 Both models have equal accuracy
1951-2001 Historical Dividend-Price -2.82 -1.70 Historical model is more accurate
Sample Model 1 Model 2 Test Statistic Critical Value Inference
1923-2001 Dividend Dividend-Price -0.40 -1.67 Both models have equal accuracy
1923-1950 Dividend-Price Dividend -1.63 -1.70 Both models have equal accuracy






Table 7: Andrews-Quandt Structural Break Tests  
Panel A: Structural breaks in the Barclays Market Dividend-price ratio
Dependent Sample Break Test
Variable  Period Date Statistic p-value Inference
Barclays DPDUM 1902-1951 1919 1.94 0.80 Structural Break is statistically insignificant
Barclays DPDUM 1952-2002 1992 20.45 0.00 Structural Break is statistically significant
Panel B: Structural breaks in the Datastream Industry Dividend-price ratios
Dependent Sample Break Test
Variable  Period Date Statistic p-value Inference
Total Market 1966-2002 1993 14.93 0.003 Structural Break is statistically significant
Resources 1966-2002 1993 11.98 0.010 Structural Break is statistically significant
Basic Industries 1966-2002 1993 4.76 0.274 Structural Break is statistically insignificant
General Industries 1966-2002 1993 4.89 0.259 Structural Break is statistically insignificant
Cyclical Consumer 
Goods
1966-2002 1992 7.51 0.082 Structural Break is statistically significant*
Non-cyclical 
Consumer Goods
1966-2002 1984 10.85 0.018 Structural Break is statistically significant
Cyclical Services 1966-2002 1992 15.22 0.002 Structural Break is statistically significant
Non-cyclical 
Services
1966-2002 1973 8.70 0.048 Structural Break is statistically significant
Financials 1966-2002 1993 10.93 0.017 Structural Break is statistically significant
* at the 10% significance level
Notes:
All series have been adjusted for the effects of outliers by inserting zero-one dummies for the specific dates.
In the case of the Industry dividend-price ratios they have a dummy for the 1974 stock market crash.
The Barclays series has dummies for 1915, 1919, 1921 and 1974. 
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Figure 1: The UK and the US Dividend-price ratio: 1900-2002 
 




Figure 2: Plot of Dickey Fuller test statistics calculated using a 40 year rolling window 
 
Figure 2A: Rolling 40 year Dickey Fuller Tests on the UK Dividend-Price Ratio 
 
Figure 2B: Rolling 40 year Dickey Fuller Tests on Series DPDUM, the UK Dividend-Price Ratio  























































































































































































































































Figure 4: UK Dividend-Price Ratio and Best-Fit line with a permanent mean break in 1993. 
Notes:  
Best  fit  line  is  given  by  the  equation  1993 , where 1993D takes the DPDUM D a b = +  
value 1 for t 1993 ³ and 0 for t 1992. £






























































































UK Dividend-price ratio with 4 Dummies Fitted D/P constant break in 1993
1 1 1 1 1
1
Notes:
Figure 3A plots the Beta co-efficient from the regression:  ( ); where ( ) is ( ) or ( ).
Figure 3B plots the Beta co-efficient from the regression:  2 ( ); whe
t t t t t t t t
t t t t
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Figure 3: Time-variation in Beta Co-efficient.










































































































































































































































































































































































Beta Coefficient on Dividend Growth
Figure 3B: Forecasting 2 Year Dividend Growth: Time-variation in Beta.
1 1 1 1 1
1
Notes:
Figure 3A plots the Beta co-efficient from the regression:  ( ); where ( ) is ( ) or ( ).
Figure 3B plots the Beta co-efficient from the regression:  2 ( ); whe
t t t t t t t t
t t t t
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Figure 3: Time-variation in Beta Co-efficient.










































































































































































































































































































































































Beta Coefficient on Dividend Growth
Figure 3B: Forecasting 2 Year Dividend Growth: Time-variation in Beta. 
 
Figure 5: Datastream Industry Dividend-Price Ratios and Best-Fit lines with a permanent mean break in 1994







































Total Market Dividend-Price 1994D Fitted















































































Basic Industries 1994D Fitted







































General Industrials 1994D Fitted









































Cyclical Consumer goods 1994D Fitted







































Non-Cyclical Consumer goods 1994D Fitted







































Cyclical Services 1994D Fitted







































Non-Cyclical Services 1994D Fitted








































Notes: The Dividend-price ratio shown (DPDUM) is adjusted for the 1974 outlier by use of a dummy variable. Fitted line is given by the equation: 
1994 , where i is an industry subscript and  i i i DPDUM D a b = + 1994D takes the value 1 for t 1994 and 0 for t 1993 ³ £